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INSURER'S LIABILITY IN EXCESS OF COVERAGE
By

ROBERT

E.

MCLEAN*

Millions of dollars are paid in premiums every year for liability
insurance coverage. Yet, very few policy holders have any conception of the provisions, terms and conditions of the policy for which
they pay. For example, the standard liability policy contains the
following language:
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy
for bodily injury liability and property damage liability,
the company shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury . . .and seeking damages on account thereof, even if
such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient . . I
This places upon the company the duty to defend any action
brought against the policy holder, but the policy holder is sometimes astounded to learn that this same clause gives the company
the absolute right to pay or settle any claim made against him without regard to his culpability and even over his strenuous objections.
In some respects, the insured is thus at the complete mercy of the
insurer. He is provided with counsel chosen by the company. He
can neither direct nor interfere in the investigation. He may not
settle directly with the claimant, nor even insist that settlement
be made by the company. However, during every stage of the proceedings he must give full aid and cooperation to the company.
This does not become particularly burdensome to the insured, nor
cause him any great concern, until such time as he is sued for damages in an amount in excess of his protection under his liability
policy. If the claim is settled within the maximum limits of the
insured's coverage, the company has fulfilled its obligations and
the insured has nothing to worry about. What happens, however,
if the company either fails or refuses to settle the claim within the
policy limits?
This problem is not new to the law, but, with the passing of
time, it has become more complex. This is due in part to the fantastic increase in the manufacture and ownership of instrumentalities of injury with resulting liability. It is also due to the almost
universal education of the public by insurance companies to an
awareness of the need for insurance. Whether or not these same
companies could foretell the seriousness of the situation they fostered is a matter of conjecture. Certainly the early interpretations
of these liability policies by the courts uniformly favored the insurer. But this, as we shall see, has all changed.
One of the first cases to construe the duty to defend clause of
an insurance policy was that of Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity
and Cas. Co." in 1899. The court, in ruling in favor of the insurance
* Partner in the Denver firm of McLean and McLean.
1 Patterson and Young, Cases on Insurance 698 (4th ed. 1961).
2 92 Me. 574, 45 AtI. 503 (1899).
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company, held that the terms of the policy were controlling-that
they were clear and concise in their meaning-and that the company could not, under any condition, be liable for any amount over
and above that stated in the policy.
For several years thereafter, this rule was followed with even
more stringency. In New York, the courts adopted a buyer beware
attitude, holding that the policy gave the company an absolute
right to settle or not settle, to pay or not pay, which the insured
knew in accepting the policy, and, in the absence of fraudulent
concealment, the company could not be held liable for refusing to
settle a claim which resulted in a judgment being entered against
the insured in excess of his coverage under the policy.'
Other jurisdictions were committed to the same theory-that
the policy itself gave the company the right of control; 4 that the
insurer could contest an action if it chose, without responsibility
3 Aucrbach v. Maryland Cs. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923).
4 Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 Atl. 653 (1914).
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for the outcome;; and while the insurer had an obligation to refrain
from doing anything prejudicial to the insured, they were not required to prejudice their own interests. If a conflict appeared, the
rights of the insured must give way. 6
A minor revolution to this obvious injustice arose in the late
1920s, when policy holders throughout the county tried to enforce
upon the insurance companies a duty to either settle the claims
within the limits of their policies or become strictly liable for any
excess judgments. This, of course, was rejected, 7 but it did result
in a more equitable approach to the matter by a majority of the
courts, and two rules of construction were adopted-one of negligence and the other of bad faith.
A. The Negligence Rule
Prevalent in any negligence case is the prudent person, the
average man, and/or the reasonable man, and the degree of care
expected of him. This same standard of care has been applied with
regard to insurance companies in negotiating and settling claims
under the negligence rule. Thus, if the company refuses or fails to
settle a claim within the policy limits, but does so in a reasonable,
prudent manner, it will not be held liable for a judgment in excess
of its liability under the policy.
This poses an interesting question. On the one hand we have
the reasonable insurance company working on its own money, and
on the other hand we have the reasonable insurance company working on the money of its insured. It doesn't take much imagination
to envision that if the limits of the policy are $5,000.00, the claim
$50,000.00 and the offer of settlement $4,500.00, no reasonable man
would risk losing $45,000.00 in order to save $4,500.00. It is quite
possible, however, if the company were assured its exposure would
be no greater than $5,000.00 in any event, that it would be reasonable to risk the $500.00 in order to reduce the $4,500.00 offer of
settlement, or even eliminate it entirely.
In Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 8 which was decided
on the basis of the negligence doctrine, in ruling against the insurer, the court said: "In deciding whether to settle, the insurer
must be as quick to compromise and dispose of the claim as if it
itself were liable for the excess verdict."9
In jurisdictions where the negligence rule is followed, the
courts have refused to extend it to define the reasonably prudent
to make settlement or pay the claim with
man as one who is going
10
someone else's money.
Kansas and Texas are the only two states which seem to adhere to the minority negligence rule, the others applying negligence
as a form of bad faith. Even in these states, the question is held to
be one of fact for the jury, as in other tort actions."
5 Mears Mining Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 162 Mo. App. 178, 144 S.W. 883 (1912).
6 Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fid. & Cos. Co., 26 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. S.C. 1938); St. Joseph's
Transfer and Storage Co. v. Employers Indem. Co., 244 Mo. App. 221, 23 S.W.2d 215 (1930).
7 Georgia Cas. Co. v. Cotton Mills Prod. Co., 159 Miss. 396, 90 AtI. 653 (1931).
8 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947).
9 Id. at 487, 56 A.2d at 60.
10 Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches, Inc., 215 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. 1948).
11 Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).
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B. Bad Faith
A majority of the courts have refused to accept the negligence
rule in imposing liability on the insurer for judgments in excess of
the policy limits, preferring to adopt the equally nebulous theory
of bad faith. Perhaps this is an effort to retain the contractual aspects, because it is almost always employed in an action for damages for breach of the duty owed to the insured. Thus, the insurer
who collects the premium and assumes full control over the claim
itself, as well as the litigation, also assumes the correlative duty to
act in utmost good faith. As in other contract cases, the breach of
that duty forms the basis for an action in damages by the insured.
However, interestingly enough, the courts uniformly hold that the2
action against the insurer is founded in tort and not in contract.'
In some jurisdictions, the term negligence is used interchangeably with the term bad 4faith. 13 In others, negligence is said to be
an element of bad faith.1
The term bad faith is probably as elusive of definition as the
time worn "reasonable man." However, in setting out the factual
situation which is determinative of good or bad faith, the jury is
not called upon to decide which is more reasonable, but only whether the insurer has demonstrated a lack of good faith. In this respect
it is preferable from the standpoint of the insurer.
In Burnham v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 15 it was held that a
mistake of judgment is not bad faith.
Several excellent opinions hold that the insurer has a duty to
consider the rights and the pocketbook of the insured in the same
manner as it does its own, in negotiating settlement, and failure to
do so is bad faith. 16
In Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 17 the South Carolina court went one step further in holding that good faith required
the insurer to sacrifice its own interests for those of its insured if
there was a conflict of interests. The court said that to hold otherwise would render an indemnity policy a "delusion and a snare,"
because when a conflict arose the company would always give preference to its own interests no matter what the cost to the insured.
The recent case of Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,' 8 holds
12 Ivy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co.,

156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 Ins. L.J. 483 (1957).

13 7A Appleman, Insurance Law and Parctlce 562 (1962).
11 St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951).
15 10 Wash. 624, 117 P.2d 644 (1941).
16 Ameri-on Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951);
American Fid. & Cas. Co., Inc. v. G. A. Nirhols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1949); American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932); Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn.
App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1951).
1

Suor

roe 11.

18299 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1962).
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that the insurer may consider its own interest but may never forget that of its insured.
Where the adjustor neglected to tell his company that a verdict
in excess was probable, failure of the company to settle within the
policy limits was held to be bad faith in Johnson v. Hardware Mut.
Cas. Co.19 The court held that the adjustor, after all, was an agent
of the company and that such action was an "intentional disregard
of the financial interests of the [insured] in the hope of escaping
the full
responsibility imposed upon [the insurer] by [its] pol20
icy."
In Klefbeck v. Dous,21 the insurer discovered, after investigation, that the claim was not within the policy. The court held that
the company should have disclaimed and withdrawn at that point,
but having failed to do so, it was liable.
Failure of the company to properly investigate the case and
to prepare for trial, and the further failure to have lay and medical
witnesses available was held to be an improper defense of the interests of the insured, and evidence of bad faith, in Augustin v.
General Acc. Fire and Life Assur. Corp., Ltd.2 2 Bad faith is presumed where the insurer has notice of witnesses which it fails to
interrogate, 21 and where the investigation conducted by the insurer
is so slipshod as to prevent it2 4 from intellingently protecting the
insured in offers of settlement.
The insurer may not ignore the recommendations of settlement
made by its attorneys and adjustors,2--- nor may it escape liability
on the sole ground that it accepted and acted upon advise of counsel. 26 If the insurer has an opportunity to settle within the policy
limits after judgment in excess of 2the
limits, and fails or refuses
7
to do so, it is evidence of bad faith.
The tendency to gamble with the insured's money is usually
held to be bad faith. This is true where the insurer's liability is
clear and unequivocal,2 8 where there is less than a 50-50 chance of
winning
the case2 9 or of holding the verdict below the policy
limits, 30 or where the insurer delays settlement until the shadow
of the court house looms in the foreground, even though liability
is strong. 31
If the insurer underestimates the value of the case because of
the color, race or religion of the claimant,
this discriminatory lack
32
of foresight is tantamount to bad faith.
The insurer may not demand contribution from the insured
before
accepting an offer of settlement within its own policy lim33
its, nor may the insurer advise the insured to go south or dispose
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
20
27
2S
29
30
31
32
(1951).
33

109 Vt. 481, 1 A.2d 817 (1938).
Id. at 484, 1 A.2d at 820.
302 Mass. 383, 19 N.E.2d 38 (1939).
283 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1960).
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., supra note 16.
Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952).
Royal Transit, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1948).
Dumas, supra note 8.
Roberts v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F. Supp. 827 (1950); aff'd 186 F.2d 921 (1951).
American Fid. & Cas. Co., supra note 16.
Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 240 Fed. 573 (1917).
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook-O'Brien Constr. Co., 69 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1934).
Vanderbilt Univ. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 119 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Tenn. 1952).
Roberts v. American Fire & Cos. Co., 89 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Tenn. 1950); aff'd 186 F.2d 921
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 304 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1962).
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of all of his property, 4 without exposing itself to the dangers of
bad faith. In some instances, failure to keep the insured informed
of offers of settlement, or risk to the insured in excess of the policy
limits, may be an element of bad
faith,35 but it does not shift the
3
burden of defense to the insured. 1
The illustrations given were confined to cases in which there
was only one claimant. What happens where the policy limits are
$10,000.00 for any one person, $20,000.00 for any one accident and
$5,000.00 property damage?
This problem was considered in the very interesting and recent
case of Brown v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. 37 The U.S.F. & G.
had issued an automobile liability policy in favor of Brown with
limits of 10/20/5. Brown was involved in an accident with another
automobile and four claims were made against him, one by the
passenger in his own car, one by the driver of the other car, and
two by the passengers in the other car. The attorney representing
the two passengers offered to settle those two claims within the
$20,000.00 with the other two claimants, if such an arrangement
could be effected. While this offer was still outstanding, one company adjustor settled the claim of Brown's passenger for $6,000.00,
despite the fact he probably would have come under the limitations
of the guest statute. This left only $14,000.00 for the other three.
At approximately the same time, another company adjustor settled
the claim of the driver of the other car for $8,000.00, without even
considering the very real defense of contributory negligence on his
part. This now left only $6,000.00 to be shared by the two passen34
35
36
31

Maryland Cos. Co., supra note 30.
Springer v. Citizens Cos. Co. of N.Y., 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957).
Smoot, supra note 18.
314 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1963).
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gers, who were manifestly the only ones to be seriously considered
and who, additionally, had serious injuries. Realizing the futility of
a reasonable settlement, the two passengers sued Brown and recovered judgments in excess of $45,000.00. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second District of New York held this to be a very
real demonstration of bad faith on the part of the insurer, and
Brown received judgment against the company for the full amount.
There are other cases as interesting and informative from
many jurisdictions. Unfortunately, the question has not been
decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado. One comparable case
has been decided by the Colorado Supreme Court. In Kesinger
v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co.,3S the insured was faced with a
claim which he obviously thought had merit. The company was
advised of the claim by the insured, and by the attorney for the
claimant, in an attempt at settlement. The company replied that
it "was not interested." Thereupon the insured undertook to settle
the claim himself, and then sued his insurance company for the
amount he had paid. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the
insured could not settle the claim himself and then hold the
company liable. It further held that even though the company
may not have been "interested" in the claim or in settling it, this
was not a refusal to defend, nor was there anything to defend
inasmuch as suit had not been filed.
The opposite result was reached in Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.
v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co.,3 9 and in Evans v. Continental Cas. Co.,40
where settlement was effected by the insured after the insurer,
in both cases, refused to make settlement, and in spite of the fact
that the policies provided that no acion could be mainained against
the insurers until the insureds' losses had been determined by
final judgment.
Correlative to the main issue here is (1) whether the judgment creditor may maintain the action for the excess, and (2)
whether the insured must pay the excess judgment before instituting his action against the insurer. Because of the importance of
these factors in their relation to the primary litigation against the
insurer, they will be briefly discussed.
A. Action by Judgment Creditors
A split of authority exists as to whether the plaintiff in the
original action may maintain an action directly against the defendant's insurer, in the absence of assignment. Some policies
provide that if an execution against the insured for a final judgment is unsatisfied, the judgment creditor may garnishee the
debtor's insurance carrier. Presumably this carries with it the
same right which the insured has against the insurer for the
excess over the policy limits when the insurer has
refused or
41
failed to settle within the policy limits, in bad faith.
If there is no assignment and the policy makes no provision
for such action, it is clear from a majority of the decisions that
the judgment creditor may not maintain an action directly against
38 101 Colo. 109, 70 P.2d 776 (1937).
39 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1958).
40 40 Wash. 2d 614, 245 P.2d 470 (1952).
41 Kleinschmit v. Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 101 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1939); Auto Mut. Indem.
Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 184 So. 852 (1938).
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the insurer for the excess. 42 This would seem to be the correct
rule, because there is no contractual relationship between the
claimant and the insurer, and thus no duty to settle.
B. Necessity for Payment Prior to Suit
Very few jurisdictions require the insured to pay the full
amount of the judgment before bringing an action against the
insurer for the excess over the policy limits, where there has
been a lack of good faith on the part of the insurer in settling
within the limits of the policy coverage. This is based on the
theory that when judgment is entered against the insured, he
has been damaged to that extent and his liability is fixed. 43 While
there are no cases directly in point, it can be assumed that Colorado would follow the majority of other jurisdictions in this
respect.
The concern once borne solely by the insured, as a result of the
decisions in the early cases, is now shared by the insurer. In some
instances companies are pitted one against the other in an effort
to escape the blame. 44 Insurance companies have been and are
making desperate attempts to stem the tide of the decisions adverse
to the once sacred right they held-to absolutely control litigation
without responsibility.
In American Fid. & Cas. Co., Inc. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 45 the
company caused to be inserted in its standard policy the following
clause:
No action shall lie against the Company for penalty because of the refusal or failure of the Company to pay or
satisfy any demands or offers of settlement-even though
such demands or offers of settlement be within the Limits
of Liability of the policy....
Admittedly clever! However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit gave little credance to the effectiveness
of the clause. The court held that it would be contrary to public
policy under Oklahoma law. In any event, such a clause would
not bar recovery for actual damages suffered from a breach of
duty.
Liability of the company for excess over the policy limits, for
failure to settle within the policy limits, should be called the
"hidden protection clause," in view of the recent decisions. It
doesn't appear in the policy-not even in the fine print-but it's
there just
the same. By judicial fiat, the equities have been
46
restored.
42 Wessing v. American Indem. Co. of Galveston, Tex., 127 F. Supp. 775 (D. Miss. 1955); Canal
Ins. Co. of Greenville, S.C. v. Surgis, 114 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1959); Duncan v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas.
Co., 91 N.H. 349, 23 A.2d 325 (1941); Murray v. Mossman, et. al., 355 P.2d 985 (Wash. 1962).
43 Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1963); Comunalt v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
44. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. Am., 250 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1962).
45 Supra note 16.
46 Author's Note: Many articles have been written, and authorities quoted, on this subject. The
author, with good reason, has been limited as to scope and space, so that some of the more exhaustive treatises have been deleted. They are cited here for the benefit of the reader:
40 A.L.R. 2d 220.
68 A.L.R. 2d 883.
38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 20 (1941).
45 C.J.S. Insurance § 936 (1946).
O'Brien, Liability Beyond the Policy Limit, 20 Ins. L. J. 525 (1955).
Keeton, Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 28 Ins. L. J. 395 (1961).
Wymore, Safequarding Against Claims in Excess of Policy Limits, 28 Ins. L. J. 44 (1961).
Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility For Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1954)

